Excerpt from WSJ: Obama's GM Plan Looks Like a Raw Deal

With respect to questions posed by Mr. Nader and Mr. Weissman, number one is intriguing. After all, it costs nothing for GM and Chrysler to allow franchisees to remain in business. What it does accomplish is turning customers of the factory (distributors, in the classic sense) into debtors who hold factory goods and owe money on them, but have no way to return them in lieu of payment. Chrysler has refused to accept cars back from dealers. When their is no obvious answer one's mind turns to the political implications.

And why isn't Congress assertying their rightful place in these negotiations, as they fid in 1979 with Chrysler's first bailout? That is explored more fully in number seven, but fair use does not allow me to reprint the entire article.

Here are samples of the first 5 questions in the article published today:

Congress, not a secret task force, should decide the company's fate.
By RALPH NADER and ROBERT WEISSMAN

1) Has the task force conducted any kind of formal or informal cost-benefit analysis on the costs of a GM bankruptcy and excessive closures? These may include the social effects of lost jobs (including more than 100,000 dealership jobs alone), more housing foreclosures, the government expense of providing unemployment and social relief, lost tax revenues, supplier companies that will be forced to close, damaged consumer confidence in the GM brand, and impacts on GM's industrial creditors.

2) Do GM and Chrysler really need to close as many dealerships -- which do not cost manufacturers -- as have been announced?

3) Is the task force asking for too many plants to close and the elimination of too many brands?

4) Why is the task force permitting GM to increase manufacturing overseas for export back into the U.S.? Under the GM reorganization plan, the company will rely increasingly on overseas plants to make cars for sale in the U.S., with cars made in low-wage countries like Mexico rising from 15% to 23% of GM sales here.

5) Why is the task force supporting GM's efforts to devise a two-tier wage structure, whereby new auto jobs no longer provide a ticket to the middle class?

6) How will bankruptcy affect GM's overseas operations, with special reference to China and GM's corporate entanglements with Chinese partners?

Link to complete Wall Street Journal article here (requires subscription to log in).